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The Contracts between Leading 
Agribusiness Enterprises and Rural 
Households and Its Effects on 
Firm-level Export of Agricultural 
Products. Chao Peng et al. ABSTRACT 
In this paper, transaction cost is introduced into the general 
firm-level export behavior model. By so doing, we build a theoretical 
model explaining how connection modes between leading agribusiness 
enterprises and rural households affect the firm-level agricultural 
products export. Analyzing the dataset of 561 national leading 
agribusinesses of the year 2003, we use Tobit model to estimate the 
firm-level export effect of the connection modes. The empirical result 
demonstrates that connections in the mode of stock-cooperation or 
cooperation contracts have a significant positive effect on the 
enterprises export and export ratio. In addition, the connection with 
more characteristics of factor contract has stronger effect on export 
than that with commodity contract characteristics. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The development of leading agricultural enterprises is an 
important factor in solving the conflicts of “small household” and “large market” in China.
i In recent years, the Leading Agribusiness 
Enterprises (LAEs) greatly promoted the industrialized organization 
and strengthened the connection between farmers and enterprises. 
About 45% of the agricultural industrialized organizations are 
activated by LAEs.
ii In 2003, more than 52.7 million agricultural 
households have been attached to LAEs.
iii On the other aspects, the 
role LAEs plays in agricultural products exports is important too. 
National-level LAEs exporting profits reached $6,661,000,000 which 
amount 31.36% of the total export profits of agricultural products.
iv 
Therefore, we can say that it is LAEs that link the scattered small 
household with the comprehensive international market.   
Though the importance of contracting methods between LAEs and 
farmers is unquestionable, current research mainly focus on the 
evolution of contracting methods between LAEs and agricultural 
household (Zhou & Cao, 2001), descriptive research about the 
industrialized development of agriculture. Even though there are 
researches about the relationship between LAE and rural households, their attention has been attached to “Agricultural Contracts”.   
According to the data of national-level LAE, the average exporting 
rate of the enterprises which cooperate with the farms in the way of 
commercial contracting is only 21.4%, while the exporting rate of the 
enterprises which cooperated with farms in the ways of cooperation of 
joint cooperation reached 26.1%.The other ways of cooperation have a 
much lower exporting rate of 8.9%. 
v 
Therefore, by taking both the ways of LAE cooperating with farms 
and its export, we aim to analyze which kind of effect the ways of 
LAE-farm cooperation impose on agricultural export and vice verse. 
This research can not only further our understanding of the 
organization patterns of Chinese agricultural industrialization, but can 
also can give us implications to improve current agricultural 
industrializing patterns.   
THEORETICAL MODEL 
How to introduce the contracting patterns between LAE and farms into 
enterprise exporting behavior model   The linkage between farmers and leading processors is an essential 
procedure before the production. The Modes can be defined as two types, 
factor bond and commodity bond (Zhou & Cao, 2002). If transaction 
cost in the market is lower than inner transaction cost, a firm may adopt 
factor bond with farmers. Before production, transaction cost may come 
from negotiation about contract, enforcement, and cost from agents 
(1996). The vertical integration will help firms to reduce two kinds of 
transaction cost: i) seeking cost, ii) risks from low quality (Barkema & 
Cook, 1993). When test cost is too high and can not reflect the quality. 
It will lower market price. In all, vertical integration will reduce 
transaction cost (Hennessy, 1996).
vi  By so doing, the price can go down 
to compete with other firms (Economides, 1999).   
Enterprise exports are affected by factors like techniques, scale, 
input etc. A lot of studies on these factors have been conducted, most of 
which took an in-depth investigation on the level of enterprises 
(Schlegelmilch and Crook, 1988; Kumar and Siddharthan, 1994; 
Bernard and Jensen, 2001) with their focuses on building empirical model to estimate whether the enterprise export or their export 
quantities, but few has strict model frame. The model deduction done by 
Aitken， Hanson and Harrison (1997) is comparatively strict, they claims 
that the market selection of enterprises of great representativeness can 
be described as selling products in different markets with the 
maximized profits:   
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Among which p, q respectively stands for price and sales quantity, 
d, f domestic market and international market, h, the production cost, m 
the cost of commodity circulation. However, instead of discussing 
export or export rate, they only investigated with whether export as the 
induced variable. Barrios，Görg and Strobl (2003) expand their study to 
export rate and considered difference of product market.   
The connection between farms and LAE is the stage before 
production and can be divided according to the types of contract—factor contract and commodity contract (Zhou & Cao, 2002). 
Because market transaction cost is higher than management cost 
(internal trade cost), the enterprise adopted the way of factor contract. 
Since transaction cost mainly arises from contract drafting, negotiation, 
supervised execution etc., it is closely related to agency cost 
(Williamson， 1996). Barkema and Cook (1993) proposed in their 
research of pork market vertical integration to reduce these two kinds 
of costs through vertical integration: (1) seeking cost;(2) risk cost of 
acquiring low quality raw materials. When the test cost is outrageous 
and can not fully reflect the quality of commodity, the test result will 
affect market price. Vertical integration can probably reduce this 
transaction fee (Hennessy, 1996) .Then the price will be lowered and 
market shares increase.   
At present little attention has been paid to the export of enterprises, 
if it had any, they did not analyze the effect of the cooperation pattern 
between upper and lower producers at the pre-production stage on 
enterprise export. In fact, to neglect this point is to neglect the effect of raw materials. Studies on contract and transaction cost brought a new 
idea to the solution of this problem, that is the contracting pattern not 
only lead to the difference of transaction costs, but also influence 
enterprise export. In this paper will try to find out the effects of 
different transaction cost on enterprise export.   
 
Introduction of transaction cost and modification of enterprise export 
model 
In the model built by Aitken ， Hanson and Harrison (1997), 
production cost and selling circulation cost are all simple quadrics and 
only the circulation cost difference of exporting products and 
domestic-sold products are taken into consideration, but the effect of 
technical standard and inspection & quarantine standards difference on 
production cost are neglected.
vii As we stated above, the enterprise 
may have to deal all kinds of transaction costs when acquiring raw 
materials and the transaction costs varied with contracting patterns. 
Williamson (1996) believed that only through comparing systems, that is to compare one contract with another one, can their own transaction 
cost be estimated. In this sense, we only need to compare the 
transaction cost of all kinds of contracts.   
Therefore, we the following assumptions:   
i) Agricultural enterprises face competitive market;
viii 
ii) Transaction costs of enterprise-farm cooperation relating to 
contracting patterns can be separated, that is only one part of the 
transaction cost are relevant to enterprise-rural household cooperation 
patterns.  
iii) Every enterprise should adopt one pattern to cooperate with 
rural household；   
iv) In the interval where the production is positive, transaction cost 
increase with production.   
v) All cost forms are simple quadrics (Aitken etc., 1997; Barrios 
etc., 2003).   
Under these premises, we recount the cost of agricultural products 
as following form:      (,) () () ( ) () () df dd f f d f dd f f Cq q h q h q Tq q m q m q F =++ + ++ +
       （ 2）  
Among which, F is the fixed cost. 
While the production cost and circulation cost can be expressed as,   
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Among which,  l a >0 and  l b >0，   l=d or f. Different from the model 
proposed by Aitken etc., we believe that exporting products and 
domestic-sold products are different in production cost,  l a  and  l g are 
correlated with the techniques of the enterprise and other factors that 
may cause cost difference; a lot of meanings were attached to  l b  and 
l c ix, whether the products are exported or sold domestically, they are 
affected by all kinds of factors such as the product certification, the 
enterprise credit grade etc., which lead to their cost difference. 
Meanwhile, the organization system can also influence the export in 
certain degree.   
Transaction cost (associated with enterprise-rural household cooperation) function is as follow:   
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Among which, t and t′can be written as:   
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Among which, t>0 and t′>0, they only relates to cooperation pattern, k 
is the kth contracts, K is the number of the contract patterns, x means 
the enterprise adopt the xth contract,  k t and  k t′
 are  transaction  cost 
indexes with relative meaning and only related to contract patterns.  o t  
is the other measures of factors concerning supervision, for example, 
the enterprise motivation mechanism and transaction-related service. 
Knoeber and Thurman（ 1995） noticed in their study of the 
industrialization of roasted chicken that the manufacturing company 
supplied chicken, feedstuff and offer veterinary service to producers, 
and the producers supply capital in the form of labor force and chicken 
farm. Because chicken-raising need a large-scale sunk investment, they 
believed that the processors give the incentive investment willingness a credible signal which induced the self-selection of high quality 
producer to solve the problem of adverse selection, this kind of signal 
does not exist in vertical integration.   
So, the profit maximization aim of typical agricultural products 
enterprises become:   
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The hypotheses of export sales export proportion 
Put formulas (3), (4), (5) into formula (7) and get the maximization 
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It is obvious that if there was the mth and nth ways of 
household-enterprise contracting, since  mn tt > ,  mn tt ′ ′ > , then we get 
() ( ) EXm E Xn < . That indicates that enterprises adopting contracting 
ways of lower cost export more.   
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According to formula (9), the effects of different exchanges cost 
on export rate are complicated. It is possible that even if enterprise 
adopting low exchange cost contract have large export quantity, a large 
domestic sales growth which leads its export rate lower than that of 
enterprises adopting contract of higher costs. The direction which is 
affected by enterprise export rate may not be certain, but we have to 
point out that it is the current situation that China’s high-quality 
agricultural products are mainly exported to foreign countries. The 
costs of supplying high quality agriculture product to enterprises are 
comparatively higher, and generally speaking, pf >pd, thus the export 
rate is possibly increase with the contract-caused exchange cost 
decrease  
On the basis of the above analysis, we propose the following hypothesis:  
Enterprises tend to export the products, when the exchange cost of 
contract is low.   
 
DATA SOURCE 
The data we used are all from the 2003 audit materials of 582 
national-level LAEs collected by agricultural industrialization office 
of Agricultural Department. Because the materials of 21 LAEs are 
incomplete, we only have 561 validate samples. The audit materials 
include basic data of the total investment, real estate, assets liability 
ratio, total sales, domestic sales, exports, credit grade, ownership etc., 
data which demonstrate product characteristics like main product types, 
enterprise certification, even data that illustrate LAE-rural household 
cooperation patterns such as whether enterprises supply services to the 
rural households, whether they purchase agricultural products at 
protection price, patterns with which the LAEs promote rural 
households. Since there are serious standards for LAE and all of them are selected with strict audition, we believe the samples used in this 
paper represent the most important part of LAE in China.
x 
As is shown is Table 1, the average total assets is 736.8 million 
RMB, average fixed assets is as high as 277.4 million RMB, average 
liability/asset ratio is 46.9%, average profit is 33.8 million RMB with 
an average profit rate as 7.1%.   
Table 1 Description of Leading Enterprises   
 
From the perspective of industry structure, 45.3% of the enterprises 
are engaged in crops processing or productions with crops as the raw 
materials; and about 32.8% of the enterprises take livestock breeding 
products as raw materials. Enterprises (because its raw material can be 
products of either planting industry or livestock breeding industry, so 
it is considered separately) producing oil or grease is of 8.0%. And 
enterprises of other industry are of 21.4%.
xi 
See from the enterprise ownerships, more than 50% of them are 
limited liability companies with unclear ownership, following are the 32.3% of mixed ownership with shareholders system; in addition, there 
are 7.7% state-owned enterprises, 2.5% collectively-owned enterprise, 
2.5% joint ventures of Hongkong, Mocao and Taiwan, 2.1% 
overseas-funded enterprises, 2.0% enterprises and sino-foreign joint 
ventures with a small portion of 0.4%.   
See from the leading enterprise-rural household connecting modes, 
contracting mode takes the largest portion of 85.0%, cooperation or 
share system mode take 8.9% and 6.1% enterprises are of the other 
modes. Besides, 61.7% of the leading enterprises have exporting 
business. In accordance with our study objective, we connect these two 
factors together and get Table 2. It is found that the export amount and 
export rate vary with enterprises with different connecting modes. 
Enterprises adopting cooperative or shareholding cooperative mode 
have the largest export amount and the highest exporting rate and 
enterprise adopting connecting modes other than cooperation mode and 
contract mode has the smallest exporting amount and the lowest 
exporting rate.
xii Therefore, we can conclude that there is certain relation between LAEs export and their modes connecting rural 
households.  




For the sake of estimation, we write (9) and (10) into the following 
liner pattern, namely the export amount of enterprise i is as follow:   
                 1, 2 , , if i d i i i i i f i EX p q t W V D u α αη δ β γ =++ + + + +
          
（ 11）  
Among which, ti is relative transaction cost, Wi is the portion of the 
transaction cost unaffected by agricultural availability. Vector Vi is 
production cost including the effect of production input on cost. Vector 
represents all kinds of cost of transaction and marketing, including 
manufacturing cost. As it is stated in the previous part, scale factor 
might affect the exporting amount of the enterprises, so we have to 
estimate the exporting rate equitation.   The exporting rate of enterprise i is as follow:   
  1, 2 , 3, , iR f iR d iR d i R i R iR i R i i R i ERp q pt W V D u α ααη δ β γ =+++ + + + +
     （ 12）  
Considering that there are large amount of enterprises have no 
exporting business, we adopt Tobit model to avoid the effect of 0 values 
on the result. Moreover, because exporting price and exporting amount 
data are not available, we choose not to introduce them into this model. 
So, based on the previous analysis and the empirical model design 
standard, we adjust formula (11) and (12) accordingly as follow:   
22
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(14) 
In the above model, x represents all the independent variables, 
while IND is a group of dummy variables that represent the industries 
an enterprise engaged in and INS is a group of dummy variables of enterprise system, β i and γ S are the corresponding index.   
According to the above empirical model, we list all the variables 
and description data in Table 3   
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables and 
Independent Variables 
 
To verify the hypothesis, we focus on the indices η 1 and η 2 of coop 
and con. If both η 1 and η 2 are greater than zero, we can conclude that 
the exporting amount of enterprise adopting contracting or cooperation 
modes is larger than that of the enterprises adopting other contracting 
modes. Namely the hypothesis is verified. Of course, the values of η 1 
and η 2 are also a question we are interested in.   
EMPIRICAL RESULT 
A line of Table 4 reports the estimation result of exporting amount 
equation, equation (13); while line B reports the estimation result of 
exporting rate equation, equation (14), in which effects of scale are 
eliminated.  Tobit model estimation pursues the maximization of logarithm 
likelihood value. The logarithm likelihood value -3523.19 of exporting 
amount equation is obviously greater than that of exporting rate 
equation with a value of -417.19.   
Table 4 Estimation for Export Rate and Export 
The Implication of Contract Modes on Export 
As it was shown in the empirical results, the hypothesis was tested. 
The firms connected with farmers through contract export more. This 
trend remains after we get rid of the scale effects. The coefficient of 
cooperative mode or share-holding cooperative mode is 0.34 and 
significant at 5% level. Both the coefficients and significant levels of 
cooperative mode are more than those of contract mode. In another word, 
for export, cooperative mode works better than contract mode.   
Cooperative mode offers a kind of factor bond from firm to farmers. 
This kind of bond is lower in transaction cost. In the specification of 
model, we found that the firms connected with farmers through contract 
mode export more. Factor bond will work better for connecting firms and farmers. To begin with, firms will control stricter on quality. And 
quality control is easier to be realized. Moreover, an enterprise will 
gain a stable material source after cooperate with farmers through 
share-holding, collective or cooperatives. Under cooperative mode, 
farmers usually share profit with firms. Farmers become the workers in 
firms or share holders in some sense. Even somebody plays both roles. 
By so doing, rural households who produce for enterprises would like to 
bound themselves to processors. In some sense, they are in the common. 
And this result in lower transaction cost of firms. This kind of saving is 
from negotiation before production, management in production, trade 
after production, enforcement and so on. 
We have discussed above, contract mode has its own advantage. 
But firms need to establish some ties to prevent farmers from 
opportunism behavior to gain this kind of advantage. If the prices of 
agricultural products do not raise a lot, rural households will not 
default. However, if the prices of agricultural products raise a lot and 
are much higher than the contract prices before production, rurual households may not enforce the contract. A small-scale farmer will take 
little risk and cost to break a contract. So the punishment from breaking 
a contract will not make a rural household to enforce a contract (Guo, 
2006).  
As a comparison, other connection modes may decrease the 
transaction cost of firms. If a firm procure material through market, it 
may face difficulties such as: i) difficulties to monitor the quality; ii) a 
kind of special transaction cost, seeking cost, including seeking for 
material source, seeking for qualified agricultural products; even iii) 
cost from bargaining for prices.   
Implication of other transaction cost 
The numbers of farmers who have trade connection with firm have 
positive effects with firm export. But this number is lower in 
significant level when export rate is taken as dependent variable. So 
this independent variable is significantly related with scale. After 
getting rid of scale effect, the significant level is lower than before. It 
seems that service offered to farmers will help firms to export. But the t-test is not significant. It is hard to measure how good the service is. 
If firms offer farmers seed, fertilizer, pesticide and food safety 
guidance which meet export standard, it will be good for export. The 
protective price is negatively correlated with the export of firms. The 
significant level decreases after we get rid of scale effect. The reasons 
may be: exerting protective price will make cost of firm increase. It 
may set a lowest price for a firm, the firm will not buy agricultural 
material and will reduce its export.   
Other determinants of export 
The technology level of a firm is negatively correlated with its 
export. It reflects the export situation of Chinese agricultural export. 
The agricultural products exported are mainly primary agricultural 
products. This is usually the aim of firms engage in agricultural 
development. As the improving of technology, export of firm will 
increase. So the t-test is not significant. The credit level has no 
significant effect on export. It really matters for export to pass 
ISO9000 certification. Because the certification may help products overcome trade barriers. Firm institution and industry will also affect 
export.  
CONCLUSION 
The connecting mode of leading agribusiness and rural household 
has a significant impact on the connection between China’s small rural 
household and international market. From the perspective of 
transaction cost, we analyze different effects and effects mechanism of 
different connecting modes through investigating the effect of 
connecting modes between national level leading agribusiness and rural 
household imposed on their export amount and export inclination   
Results of theoretical and empirical study indicate that connecting 
mode with more potent contracting features is beneficial to export, 
connecting modes with more characteristics of commercial contract also 
has positive effect on export though it effect is not as significant as 
that of factor contracting mode. Besides, other connecting modes 
including external market have little promotion effect on export.   
After eliminating scale factor effect, the effect of connecting mode on LAE’ export is more significant. LAE adopting shareholder system 
or cooperation system connecting rural household has more inclination 
to export and LAE adopting contract mode also has this inclination 
though it is not as strong as that of LAE of previous types.   
Table 1 Description of Leading Enterprises   





736.8 2303.7  11.6  45908.3 
Fixed Assets 
(million RMB) 
277.4    749.9  7.07  15551.7 
Liability/Asset 
Ratio (%) 
46.9    14.7  1  97.9 
Profit (million 
RMB) 
33.8 79.2  -2.8 975.0 
Profit Margin (%)  7.1  8.7  -18.2  91.5 










  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Export (million 
USD) 
16.3 35.1 11.8 42.0  7.2  15.5 
Export  Rate  (%) 26.1 68.9 21.7 36.6  9.0  19.3 




Dependent Variable  Note  Mean  SD 






ER  Export Rate  (Export×8.277) / Sales  0.215  0.400
 Independent 
Variables 
Note    
t modes  connecting 
rural households 
    
coo   (share-holding) 
cooperative 
Dummy Variable  0.089  0.285
con contract  Dummy  Variable  0.850  0.357
W other  transaction 
cost 
    






ser offer services to 
farmers 
Dummy Variable  0.975  0.156
pro exerting protective 
price 
Dummy Variable  0.938  0.242
V        avc  variable cost  Million RMB    4.043  15.2 
hit high-tech  enterprise  Dummy Variable  0.444  0.497
IND product  type       
IND1 planting  products  Dummy  Variable  0.453  0.498
IND2 livestock  products Dummy  Variable  0.328  0.470
IND3 edible  oil  Dummy  Variable  0.080  0.272
D other  factors  may 
affect export 
    
cre  credit rating  A=1; AA=2; AAA=3;  2.367  0.677
iso passed  ISO9000  Dummy  Variable  0.857  0.350
INS firm  institution       
INS1 Hong  Kong,  Macao, 
Taiwan 
Dummy Variable  0.025  0.156
INS2 Joint  Advanture  Dummy  Variable  0.004  0.060
INS3 exclusively 
foreign-owned  
Dummy Variable  0.021  0.145
INS4 State  Owned 
Enterprise 
Dummy Variable  0.077  0.266
INS5 collective  owned    Dummy  Variable  0.025  0.156
INS6 private  owned  Dummy  Variable  0.020  0.139
INS7 mixed  owned  Dummy  Variable  0.301  0.459
 Table 4 Estimation for Export Rate and Export 
 A  B    A  B 



























































































R squre  0.1033  0. 0661
Note: The standard errors are in the parenthesis. *, ** and *** 
refers to significant at the level of 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01. Specifically, the 
R square here is the square for correlated efficient between real value 
and estimated value of independent variable.   
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i  Document No 1 of 2007, the guideline of Chinese agricultural 
policies, evaluated leading processors as “an important force to lead 
farmers to develop modern agriculture”. 
ii Niu,  2006. 
iii  The source of export data is from Monthly Statistics of Ex & Import 
of Agricultural Products published by Ministry of Commerce. 
iv  The source of data is the same with note 2. 
v The source of data is from Agriculture Industrialization Office of 
Ministry of Agriculture. 
vi  Vertical integration is equal to linkage through factor bonds. 
vii  Quality control can be considered as a pressure of processing. 
It will make the production slow, even stop. So the cost comes out 
(Klein & Brester, 1997). The production of two different 
commodities with different quality control can be considered as 
two productions. Perrin (1999) used to consider beef and beef 
with ray exposure as two different productions.   
viii  Zeng & Peng (2007) offered some details about this premise.                                                                                                                                                     
ix According to Aitken et. al (1997) and Barrios et. al (2003),  b f＝
b d. It refers to the equality of marginal revenue. But in our paper, we 
divided the export and home sale market as two different markets. So 
b f≠ b d.  
x National leading processors should meet a lot criterion, such as 
firm’s organizations, assets, financial situation, connection to 
farmers and competence. 
xi  Some firms engage in not only one industry.   
xii  Other mode mainly refers to procurement in market. 